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Friendly Fire: Wheat Subsidy 
in Punjab, Pakistan 
 




During the past decade every year the Punjab government has faced an awkward 
situation at wheat harvest. It must buy millions of tons of wheat at an above-market price 
despite massive carry-forward stocks already lying in its granaries. Cost of procuring such 
huge quantities and subsidising sales to flour mills is enormous and is met with commercial 
borrowing. In recent years, the government has struggled to balance its accounts for wheat 
operations; its outstanding liability to commercial banks stood at Rs. 444.7 billion in June 
2018, viz. 22 percent of the total budget of the province in 2017-18. Clearly, the government 
procures more wheat annually than it needs with borrowed money that it cannot pay back. 
Ostensibly, wheat procurement aims to benefit small farmers, but its procedures exclude, 
rather than include them. Conversely, consumers end up buying expensive wheat-flour. A 
significant beneficiary of the procurement regime appears to be commercial banks finance the 
procurement and earn interest thereupon. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Several recent studies (Aamir, 2017; Ahmad and Farooq 2010; Amid 2006; 
Cummings, et al. 2006; Dorosh and Salam 2008; Prikhodko and Zrilyi 2013; Scott and 
Hernandez 2018; World Bank, 2010) have highlighted inefficiency, high cost and 
wastefulness of food subsidy programs in developing countries. These programs usually 
started as small interventions with a specific mandate responding to a particular crisis 
(e.g. ration cards during WWII in several British colonies (Alderman, 1988), but they 
gradually morphed into large generalised subsidy regimes that by the end of the 20th 
century were significantly contributing to what O’Connor (1979) and Offe (1984) call 
‘the fiscal crisis of the welfare state.’ Yet, subsidy rollback—even of the obviously 
wasteful types—has been difficult, and governments have struggled to design and 
implement reform packages that reduce costs without unduly harsh political backlash 
(Gutner, 2002). 
Often these subsidies are justified with reference to the need to support farmer 
incomes and poor urban consumers (e.g. PFD Overview, n.d.). Since these are large 
groups, policymakers consider as politically unfeasible any proposal for a drastic 
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reduction in food subsidy programs, their increasing costs and apparent ineffectiveness 
notwithstanding (Gutner, 2002). The untested assumption in these assertions is that food 
subsidies actually benefit farmers and poor urban consumers. This is an empirical 
question and must be settled as such. 
Punjab’s wheat subsidy programme—worth  Rs. 30 billion a year (US$ 216 
million)
1
—presents itself as a good candidate for deconstructing the claim that food 
subsidies benefit farmers and consumers. The wheat subsidy is Punjab’s largest subsidy 
and a cornerstone of its efforts to promote food security (Dawn 15
th
 April, 2017). Each 
year, the Punjab government procures millions of tons of wheat during harvest season at 
above-market prices and sells wheat to flour mills over the year at below-market prices. 
The objective is to protect farmers from a price crash at harvest time and to subsidise 
consumers’ flour purchases (PFD Market Stabilisation, n.d.). During the past ten years, 
existing stocks and fresh procurement have comprised a massive inventory, much larger 
than government’s average annual release to flour mills. To finance procurement 
operations, the government borrows money from various banks, but it has consistently 
failed to pay back its outstanding debt to banks and has been paying huge sums as the 
mark-up. Clearly, the Punjab government is procuring more wheat than it needs with 
borrowed money that it cannot pay back. 
This paper is a critical examination of the wheat subsidy regime in Punjab. The 
Punjab Food Department (PFD) borrowed Rs. 115.4 billion from a consortium of banks 
to finance a massive procurement of 3.62 million tons in 2018. PFD procured this huge 
quantity despite a carry-forward stock of 3.59 million tons already lying in its granaries 
from previous year’s procurement. Given that PFD’s average annual release to flour mills 
(3-3.5 million tons) was smaller than its carry-forward stocks, there was no reason to 
procure more wheat in 2018. Prima facie, such massive procurement is done each year 
‘for the economic well-being of small farmers’ (Dawn 15th April, 2017). But does it 
really benefit them, or are there other groups benefiting from this massive public 
intervention carried out in the name of small farmers? 
The analysis below shows that small farmers are largely excluded from the process 
and receive only a fraction of the benefit, if at all. Furthermore, PFD is unable to pay 
back the money it borrows every year. Its outstanding liability to commercial banks stood 
at Rs. 444.7 billion in June 2018. This appears a case of ‘friendly fire’— borrowing from 
military terminology whereby a military is hit by its own shelling (Sen, 2005: 212-15). 
Punjab’s wheat subsidy is an example of a public intervention that ends up hurting the 
interests of those very poor whose interests it was supposed to protect. 
This paper fills an important gap. Although, there is a large body of literature on 
food subsidies in developing countries, there are only a few published studies on 
Pakistan. No study dissects Pakistan’s wheat subsidy to see where exactly the money is 
spent. Most studies (e.g. Alonso and Swinnen, 2016; Dorosh and Salam, 2008) focus on 
estimating how the benefit is shared between producers, consumers and intermediaries. 
Further, there is rarely an effort to distinguish between the interests of small, medium and 
large farmers, or to identify the institutionalised mechanisms that include/exclude various 
producer groups (see for example Aamir, 2017; Ahmad and Farooq, 2010). This paper, 
on the other hand, closely looks at official data to identify commercial banks as  
 
1US$ 1 = Rs. 139 (in January 2019). 
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significant beneficiaries of wheat subsidy in Punjab. This is a surprising finding. The 
interest collection by banks on government’s current borrowing and outstanding dues 
comprises 3/4
th
 (in some years > 90 percent) of the total amount brandished as wheat 
subsidy. This had escaped researchers’ eye so far. 
In addition to this short-term buildup of stocks and debt, this paper identifies the 
mechanisms that exclude small farmers from participating in official procurement 
campaigns as a more serious structural problem. By closely examining the grossly under-
explored micro-processes of wheat procurement and the logistical life behind 
procurement numbers in Punjab, this paper invites and provokes policy communities to 
rethink the subsidy regime in Punjab so that a greater proportion of benefits reaches small 
farmers and urban consumers, in whose name the subsidy is provided. 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
The case study method was considered appropriate to gain insights into 
considerations behind official decisions, their implementation and impact on identifying 
micro-processes that include/exclude various groups (Babbie, 2012). Secondary and 
primary data on wheat operations were collected during Feb-July 2017 and April-May 
2018. Secondary data sources included PFD records and periodic surveys of the 
Pakistan/Punjab Bureau of Statistics. PFD records are public data since they are part of 
the (unclassified) record maintained by government departments in the normal course of 
their working. Anyone can obtain a copy upon a formal request under the Punjab 
Transparency and Right to Information Act, 2013. The authors were able to view these 
records after explaining to the Secretary PFD that the data were required for academic 
analysis. Authors’ previous engagement with these officials for other policy research 
helped establish the bona fide of data collection. Data from the Pakistan/Punjab Bureau 
of Statistics were available on their websites. The analysis below uses PFD data for the 
past ten years only. Although, PFD maintains time series data for earlier period as well, 
but the same are not relevant to this analysis. Prior to 2008, there was no buildup of 
stocks
2
 or outstanding bank debts. 
Primary data were collected in the districts of Sargodha, Sheikhupura and 
Vehari—these are located in Western, Central and Southern Punjab respectively. 
Unstructured interviews were conducted with 35 respondents, including 15 farmers (eight 
had farms < 12.5 acres, five had farms between 12.5 – 25 acres, and two had farms > 25 
acres),
3
 nine PFD officials, four grain merchants, two flour miller, two urban consumers 
and three rural non-farm households. Initially, 45 farmers were selected from PFD’s list 
of farmers (discussed later) in the field districts. But we managed to interview only 15 of 
them as the remaining were either absentee landlords, were out of town during our field 
work, or were simply unwilling to be interviewed. In PFD, we were able to interview two 
senior managers, one District Food Officer, and six officials working at Procurement 
 
2PFD’s time series data show that it’s carry-forward stocks have historically hovered around 0.25 
million ton. They crossed one million ton in 2001, stayed the same in 2002, but declined quickly thereafter to 
levels below the usual. They rose again in 2006 to 1.4 million ton and declined thereafter. Consistent build-up 
of stocks to alarming levels is a recent phenomenon. 
3These are called small, medium and large farmers respectively in this paper. Farmers of less than one 
acre are called very small farmers. 
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Centres. Other respondents were selected for convenience, i.e. people who were willing 
to talk to us. Each interview was conducted in person by the authors in Urdu for 50 
minutes on average (the shortest took 25 minutes and the longest was slightly less than 
two hours). There was no opportunity to record interviews, so we took notes. 
Our fieldwork coincided with procurement campaigns in 2017 and 2018 (i.e. mid-
April to end May in both years), hence several interviews could be conducted in situ. We 
frequently visited key sites, such as procurement Centres, grain markets, bank branches, 
storage places, and spent time in villages observing the procurement as it happened. On 
different days, we spent a total of 28 hours in procurement centres, five hours in grain 
markets, four hours in banks, and 20 hours at various farms to carry out field 
observations. In addition to capturing stakeholder perspectives, this provided an 
opportunity to observe what Krishnamurthy (2012: 74) called the ‘micro-practices of 
procurement.’ We took field notes, which were later expanded into detailed observations 
to inform analysis and writing. 
Further, one author had personal exposure to wheat operations through his 
association with an NGO (Fountain House) that has a wheat-producing farm (around nine 
acres) in Sheikhupura district for agro-based therapy of people with mental health 
conditions. The farm was able to sell its wheat to PFD in 2016, but not in 2017 and 2018 
despite several follow up visits to concerned offices. This provided a first-hand 
experience of exclusion by the bureaucratic apparatus that ostensibly existed to benefit 
small farms like this. 
The spread of fieldwork over two years and ethnographic observation of various 
actors provided critical insights into PFD’s wheat procurement process that would have 
been difficult to gain otherwise. Most of the fieldwork was carried out in 2017. However, 
official data on procurement and bank borrowing were updated in 2018, and short visits 
to (mostly the same) respondents and key sites enabled verification of observations across 
years and also allowed us to clarify confusions that had emerged while writing this paper. 
 
3.  PROCUREMENT TRENDS AND PRICE 
Government’s intervention in wheat market dates back to 1968, when it procured 
wheat for the first time in response to bumper crop for two consecutive years that the 
market did not clear (Aziz, 1979). Gradually, the government became the principal buyer 
and the private sector’s role shrank. To keep flour prices low for poor households, it 
established an extensive network of ration-shops, which provided subsidised wheat flour 
to low-income households. Ration system was abolished in 1987 due to partial targeting, 
inefficiencies and corruption (Alderman, 1988; Islam and Garrett, 1997). The ration 
system was replaced with a subsidy on wheat issued to flour mills by the government 
from its procured stocks. Thus, a targeted subsidy was replaced by a general subsidy that 
ultimately became far more expensive than the one it replaced (Alderman, 1988). The 
twin requirements of clearing stocks during harvest season and providing subsidised 
wheat to flour mills later in the year led the government to procure progressively larger 
volumes of wheat each year. 
As shown in Table 1, in the recent past, PFD has procured very large and variable 
quantities of wheat each year without an apparent link to production, existing stocks, 
or flour  mills’ demand. On average, wheat  procurement has  been 18.6 percent of total  
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Table 1 











Issued to flour 
Mills (% of Total 
Available) 
2008 18.23 0.01 2.56 (14.0) 0.61 (0) 3.18 2.72 (85.5) 
2009 18.42 0.23 5.78 (31.4) 0 (0) 6.01 3.04 (50.6) 
2010 17.92 2.93 3.72 (20.8) 0 (0.91) 5.74 3.08 (53.7) 
2011 19.04 1.88 3.19 (16.8) 0 (0) 5.07 3.20 (63.1) 
2012 17.74 1.74 2.78 (15.7) 0 (0) 4.52 4.02 (88.9) 
2013 18.63 0.48 3.68 (19.8) 0 (0) 4.16 4.02 (96.6) 
2014 19.70 0.13 3.74 (19.0) 0 (0) 3.87 1.83 (47.3) 
2015 19.20 1.96 3.23 (16.8) 0 (0.25) 4.94 2.90 (58.7) 
2016 19.40 2.26 3.93 (20.3) 0 (0.44) 5.75 3.52 (61.2) 
2017 20.46 2.58 3.95 (19.3) 0 (0) 6.53 3.60 (55.1) 
2018 19.60 3.59 3.62 (18.5) – 7.21 – 
Source: Constructed from PFD data. 
 
production. PFD has issued only a part of its available stock to flour mills and the 
rest has stayed in its granaries each year. Thus, in most years, PFD has significant 
carry-forward stocks from previous years. The peak procurement (5.78 million tons) 
during the past ten years was in 2009 and resulted in 2.93 million tons carry forward 
stocks at the time when procurement began in 2010. This must have translated into 
huge storage costs for PFD in 2009-10. Only small quantities of wheat are imported 
and exported, if at all. Mostly, import comprises food aid received from abroad. 
Small volumes of export despite massive surpluses can be explained in terms of the 
gap between the domestic and international prices, the former being higher than the 
latter (Aamir, 2017). 
The procurement price-set in October-November each year —is supposedly based 
on the cost of production but is in practice determined by an interplay of technical and 
political considerations. Its comparison with the international price of wheat since 2001 
(Figure 1) demonstrates that in most years the former has been below the latter.  
Procurement price has never decreased from its previous level: it has either increased 
from year to year or stayed the same. There were large price increases in 2008-09 and 
2009-10 that appear to be delayed responses to international price escalations. No such 
response followed a decline in the international price since 2014. Clearly, there is no 
effort to peg the domestic price with the international price and to use international trade 
to stabilise prices and/or meet domestic demand. 
158 Rana and Malik 
Fig. 1. Procurement Price and International Price 
 
Source:  Constructed from International Grain Council and PFD Data. 
Note:  International prices were converted to PKR using currency conversion rates for 30th June in each year. 
 
4.  MICRO-PROCESSES OF PROCUREMENT 
Wheat proc urement is a tedious  process in multiple ways, especially, for the 
small farmer in whose name such large procurement is justified. Several authorisations 
by petty officials characterise the process, which the farmer has to manage at his cost and 
time. This administrative burden is too heavy for most small farmers to carry and the 
process becomes the principal mechanism of their exclusion. 
Tenants and small farmers often fail to cross the very first hurdle—their names do 
not appear on patwari’s
4
 list, which is the basis of PFD procurement. Every  year, when 
the procurement season commences, PFD sets up several procurement centres to which 
various villages are assigned. Each Centre has a list of farmers in its catchment area. This 
list has several errors. Tenants are often not included in the patwari’s records on the 
insistence of influential landowners.
5
 Technically, a tenant can approach the PFD with a 
copy of the tenancy agreement to get his name included in PFD’s list. But often tenancies 
are verbal, and few small tenants will prepare formal agreements
6
 just to satisfy PFD 
requirements. 
Similarly, it is not uncommon for the names of politically weak or misaligned 
farmers to accidentally slip out of the patwari’s list. Although, an aggrieved landowner 
whose name is not on patwari’s list can approach higher officials for rectification. Our 
field work shows that this process is seldom initiated due to substantial transaction costs, 
such as multiple visits to various offices. Three out of eight small farmers in our sample 
and the Fountain House did not appear in the list in 2017. Interestingly, Fountain House 
 
4 An important field official of the Punjab government. 
5A tenant recorded in patwari’s records has certain protections against eviction. 
6 To have a written agreement, a tenant needs willingness of the landlord to sign the agreement, to do 
the paperwork and pay the legal fees (e.g. stamp duty). After this is done and the tenant has his name on PFD’s 
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was on the list in 2016 when carry-forward stocks were small and PFD was procuring 
generously, but not in 2017 and 2018 when existing stocks were large. In-charge  of 
Fountain House told us that his staff had visited their procurement centre each year to 
find out why their name was not on the list. Each time, they were returned with an advice 
to apply to the local Assistant Commissioner. The In-charge weighed the pros and cons 
of doing so, and in the end decided to sell to the local beopari instead. 
Farmers whose names are in patwari’s list proceed to the procurement centre to 
obtain jute/polypropylene bags (called bardana). Farmers can supply their wheat only in 
officially-issued bardana. Each bag bears a number which is recorded against the 
farmer’s name. Farmer’s bardana allowance is based on the national average yield of 800 
kg per acre (Pakistan, 2016), i.e. eight jute bags (100 kg each) or 16 polypropylene bags 
(50 kg each) per acre. A maximum of 200 jute bags (or 400 polypropylene bags) is issued 
to a farmer at a time.
7
 After the farmer returns filled bags, another consignment of 
bardana is issued, if needed. The farmer must pay a deposit of Rs. 134 per jute bag (or 
Rs. 38 per polypropylene bag) into a designated bank account. The bank prepares a call 
deposit receipt, which the farmer presents at the Centre to receive the bardana. Farmers 
recoup this deposit upon delivery of bagged wheat. 
Wheat-surplus farmers usually try to dispose off their produce as quickly as 
possible since they need cash for next sowing and PFD’s interventions create little 
incentive for investment in storage (Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013). PFD being the preferred 
buyer due to its high price, issuance of bardana becomes a locus of control and 
patronage. PFD issues bardana preferentially to those who are well-integrated into local 
political and social networks. Farmers keep local PFD officials in good humor throughout 
the year; the favour is retuned at the harvest time. One farmer told us: “In our lives, local 
PFD officials matter almost as much as the local police officials and patwaris do. We 
cannot afford to annoy any of them.” In years of bumper crop and low international price, 
PFD follows an unofficial go-slow policy in bardana issuance. For example, in 2017 and 
2018, the Punjab government, unwilling to buy the entire stock at a procurement price 
that it found politically unfeasible to reduce, wriggled out of the situation by rationing 
bardana to a favoured small set of farmers. The rest were put in a slow-moving queue. 
Three of our farmer respondents whose names appeared on the PFD list could not get 
bardana in their first couple of visits, whereafter they sold their wheat to middlemen at 
the (lower) market price. 
Farmers who do get the bardana can deliver wheat-filled bags only to their 
designated centre. They fill their bags, weigh them, stitch them, load them in a trolley and 
drive/escort them to the Centre. Not every farmer has the infrastructure to carry out these 
(seemingly simple) activities. The trolley has to be rented, and the rent has to be paid in 
cash. An ordinary trolley can carry 100 bags. Only two of our small farmer respondents 
had a marketable surplus exceeding 100 bags. 
Once the trolley arrives at the Centre, it is weighed if the weighbridge is available, 
or a 10 percent sample is drawn and weighed to calculate the total weight. The sample is 
also assessed for quality. It is not uncommon for politically misaligned farmers to 
experience more rigorous quality testing. The In-charge Fountain House told us: 
 
7 In 2018, the limit was set at maximum of 80 bags per farmer. 
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“In 2016, we had a good crop and our name was on the PFD list. So, I filled the 
bags and loaded the entire stock (about 200 maunds) onto trollies and sent these to 
the Centre. I am on good terms with the Centre In-charge. Still, he was unusually 
strict. He said our grain size was smaller than officially prescribed. When my staff 
argued with him, he asked them to approach the Deputy Director, PFD, which we 
did. The Deputy Director was a good man. When we told him, we are a charity 
and spend our entire income on mentally patients, he phoned the Centre In-charge 
to take it easy.” 
Transportation to the Centre and unloading of bags is farmers’ responsibility. To 
help with these labour intensive and backbreaking activities, casual labour is available at 
the centre, which is paid by farmers at Rs. 9 per 100 kg bag. PFD reimburses these labour 
charges, though not farmers’ expense on filling and stitching of bags, loading and 
transportation to the centre. 
While issuing bardana, PFD officials also advise farmers a preferred date for 
wheat delivery. The Centre populates its calendar in a manner that procurement 
operations are spread over the entire procurement season (mid-April to end-May). If 
everything goes by the schedule, the transaction is usually completed within 5-6 hours. If 
it is an unusually busy day, or if the farmer is ahead of or behind schedule, it may take 
longer. The farmer is not compensated for the wait. 
PFD also shortchanges farmers by procuring a little extra wheat (without payment) 
to compensate for loss during storage and transportation. PFD’s total storage capacity is 
2.19 million tons, and the rest of the procured wheat is stored in the open under plastic 
sheets. PFD officials estimate the loss accruing in covered and open storage as 2-2.5 
percent and 5-6 percent respectively. Still, PFD operates under a zero-loss presumption 
(Prikhodko and Zrilyi, 2013). One Centre In-charge commented: “our seniors know that 
there will be some loss during operations, yet they expect us to make up the loss 
somehow magically.” The staff readily shifts the burden onto the farmer. All farmers in 
our sample complained about being shortchanged. Fountain House, for example, had 200 
maunds for sale to PFD in 2016. They were shortchanged one kg/maund, which 
translated into a loss of Rs. 6,500 for the entire consignment. 
Upon delivery of wheat, PFD calculates farmer’s payment and pays cash for 
smaller consignments (< 50 bags) or issues a slip for larger consignments to be presented 
at the designated bank branch. At day’s end, PFD prepares a consolidated statement for 
the bank’s convenience. The bank pays the farmer upon receiving the consolidated 
statement and farmer’s payment slip, which means a farmer cannot receive his payment 
the same day but must visit the bank the next day or later. 
Our farmer respondents who sold their wheat to PFD in 2017/2018 found this 
process bureaucratic and arduous. They had to visit the procurement Centre at least thrice 
– once to ascertain if their name was in the list, then for obtaining bardana and finally for 
delivering wheat. They had to visit the bank at least twice – once to pay call deposit for 
bardana and then to collect payment. This process took between 7-10 days. Throughout 
this process, they looked up to various PFD officials for approvals – for issuance of 
bardana, for quality clearance and for payment. They also faced a lot of uncertainty. 
Even when their names were on the list, they did not know if PFD would still be 
procuring when their turn came. PFD stops procuring upon meeting its target for the year. 
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Ostensibly, these practices are designed to regulate procurement but in practice 
they place a substantial administrative burden on the farmer. They comprise a mechanism 
to effectively exclude those very small farmers who are the raison d’etre of this public 
intervention. Cash-strapped farmers who need quick payment to settle a debt, to buy 
inputs for the next crop, or to finance a marriage, sometimes prefer to sell to 
intermediaries for this very reason. One farmer respondent said: 
I had only 15-20 days after the wheat harvest during which I had to plough my 
land to clear it of weeds, and to get it levelled. I don’t have a tractor, so I rent it. But I can 
either rent one before everyone else needs them or after they are done. I can’t possibly do 
the rounds to banks and food centres. 
Further, small farmers are less likely to have the required surplus that would 
justify multiple visits to various offices, in situ labour of bag filling, weighing and 
stitching, and transportation. They are also less likely to be adequately networked to 
navigate their way through the official maze. In 2017, when the wheat campaign was 
being launched, the then Chief Minister publicly vowed that ‘small farmers will be given 
preference in wheat procurement and the government would procure as much produce as 
they would bring to the procurement centres’ (Dawn 5
th
 April, 2017). This public 
pronouncement from the highest level notwithstanding, three of our small farmer 
respondents and the Fountain House failed to sell their wheat to PFD in that year. The 
bureaucratic procurement processes had effectively excluded them. 
These bureaucratic procedures also create plenty of rent seeking and patronage 
opportunity for PFD officials. For example, in both 2017 and 2018, market prices were 
substantially lower (Rs. 1,100 – 1,250) than the PFD price (Rs. 1,300). In these years, 
while everyone wanted to sell to PFD, it had substantial carry forward stocks (Table 1) 
and was unwilling to procure beyond its target. In the absence of a neutral queuing 
system, this demand-supply gap enabled PFD officials in the field to procure wheat from 
their favoured farmers especially as the procurement season was ending. Although, none 
of our farmer respondents reported paying a bribe or using a reference (i.e. sifarish) 
themselves, almost everyone knew someone who had. 
A key challenge, therefore, for PFD is to reduce considerable discretion exercised by 
these officials. Recent debates about bureaucratic accountability and policy implementation 
highlight the discriminatory use of discretion and how this shifts policy benefits away from 
marginalised groups (Epp, et al. 2014; Schram, et al. 2009). An important enabler for misuse 
of discretionary authority is that traditional modes of monitoring, such as field inspections, 
audits, etc., fail to monitor every interaction between frontline officials and citizens. Only 
when officials stop acting like what Bovens and Zouridis (2002) call ‘tiny oligarchs’ benefits 
of policy interventions reach their intended target groups. For PFD, one possibility is to use 
technology to improve monitoring of its frontline officials, say, by developing and following a 
neutral queuing system that brings greater certainty to the procurement process. Another is to 
simplify business processes and make them more transparent. Reduction of discretion at the 
frontlines is a key challenge for PFD if it wants micro-processes of procurement to include, 
rather than exclude tenants and small farmers. 
 
5.  THE REAL BENEFICIARY 
PFD’s wheat subsidy is built into the (usually) above-market procurement price and 
below-market issue price (i.e. the price at which it sells wheat to flour mills). There have 
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been years in which market price was higher than the official price, forcing PFD to ban 
inter-provincial movement to meet its procurement targets (e.g. 2014 (The Nation, 14
th
 
May, 2014). Generally, however, PFD sets a high procurement price to incentivise wheat 
cultivation, and issues wheat to flour mills at a discounted price (PFD Overview, n.d.). 
PFD’s subsidy regime has the following objectives: (1) reduce flour price 
volatility; (2) protect farmers from a market crash; and (3) provide subsidised wheat flour 
to consumers (PFD office records).
8
 PFD has been largely successful in reducing 
seasonal fluctuations in flour prices (Pieters and Swinnen, 2016, PBS, 2015: Table 219). 
Pieters & Swinnen (2016) show that annual fluctuations across the years have also been 
reduced. However, PFD has only partially succeeded in achieving the other two 
objectives (discussed shortly). Yet the cost to the government is substantial. 
In 2017-18, the total cost of PFD’s wheat operations was Rs. 34.43 billion (Table 2). 
Ironically, such huge cost—collectively called incidental charges—was mainly due to bank 
mark-up on money borrowed for procurement. 2017-18 was by no means exceptional; 
PFD’s cost of wheat operations per unit was simply a continuation of a decade-long trend. 
Bank mark-up accounted for the largest share of the total incidental cost during the past 
decade: it was > 90 percent in 2010-13, declined thereafter, but was still quite high (around 
70 percent) in 2017-18. The next two items were transportation and PFD salaries, which 
together accounted for a mere 9.7 percent of the total cost (Table 3). 
 
Table 2 
 Total Cost of PFD’s Wheat Operations 
 
08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 
Procurement (million ton) 5.78 3.72 3.19 2.78 3.68 3.74 3.23 3.93 3.95 3.62 
Total Cost (billion Rs.) 14.45 18.60 23.33 22.42 29.38 21.42 22.78 37.26 26.68 34.43 
Cost per Ton (Rs.) 2,500 5,000 7,313 8,065 7,984 5,727 7,052 9,480 6,755 9,511 
Source: Constructed from PFD data. 
 
Table 3 
 Breakdown of Cost (Rs. per Metric Ton) 
Component 08-09 09-10 10-11 11-12 12-13 13-14 14-15 15-16 16-17 17-18 
Gunny Bags 12 13 (413) (116) (681) 5 272 1,177 788 1,284 
Delivery Expenses 70 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 90 75 
Bank Commission 59 89 89 89 99 113 113 122 122 122 
Taxes & Duties 12 16 16 12 11 12 14 15 11 15 
Transportation 
Charges 885 871 98 338 556 502 602 602 497 769 
Handling Charges 13 1 3 1 3 - 2 2 - 2.55 
Godown Expenses 90 444 133 140 202 237 385 392 222 431 
Storage & Unforeseen 
Expenses - - 145 - 123 - - - - - 
PFD Charges 145 212 188 261 330 266 293 320 308 352 






















Total per Metric Ton 2,500 5,000 7,313 8,065 7,984 5,727 7,052 9,480 6,755 9,511 
Total per 40 kg 100 200 293 323 319 229 282 379 270 380 
Source: constructed from PFD data. 
Note: These are actual costs which have not been adjusted for inflation. 
 
8 Another objective is to increase domestic production to reduce imports and to protect consumers from 
international price fluctuations. 
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Overall, PFD’s wheat operations have been progressively costing more. The per 
ton cost rose from Rs. 2,500 in 2008-09 to Rs. 9,511 in 2017-18. Though, this is largely 
due to an increase in the mark-up charges, the increase in other items is not insignificant 
altogether. For example, PFD charges have increased from Rs. 145 per ton to Rs. 352 per 
ton. Similarly, bank commission is now more than twice of what it used to be ten years 
ago. This increase is worrisome since it implies that procuring wheat is becoming 
increasingly expensive for PFD. 
The unusually high mark-up charges in recent years warrant explanation. PFD has 
a credit line with three consortia of banks to be utilised during the procurement season. 
The amount is repaid during the year as wheat is sold to flour mills. Not wanting to pass 
on the full cost of operations to consumers, the Punjab government picks up part thereof 
as a subsidy. However, since 2008 the government has been clearing only a part of its 
liabilities due to financial constraints and the rest has remained outstanding each year 
(see Table 4). Except in 2010-11 and 2012-13, repayment has been less than new 
borrowing, thereby increasing the outstanding liability. Consequently, PFD has had to 
pay the mark-up not only on its current borrowing but also on the outstanding debt. On 
average, during the last five years, PFD has paid a whopping Rs. 19.6 billion each year as 
mark-up alone. Prima facie, the Punjab Government has no intention of paying back the 
outstanding dues, as it has budgeted only Rs. 10 billion each year since 2014 for PFD’s 
wheat operations (PFD office records). Apparently, there is a tacit understanding that 
only mark-up will be paid each year—that too partly—and the outstanding liability will 
be allowed to stay —and mount. 
 
Table 4 
 Borrowing and Mark-up (Million Rs.) 
 Bank Borrowing 
Repayment Balance Mark-up Paid  Outstanding New Total 
2008-09 – 52,394 52,394 45,795 6,599 3,942 
2009-10 6,599 143,176 149,775 47,376 102,400 19,028 
2010-11 102,400 88,667 191,067 101,067 90,000 25,971 
2011-12 90,000 76,025 166,025 56,127 109,898 23,180 
2012-13 109,898 73,305 183,203 104,258 78,945 20,233 
2013-14 78,945 110,540 189,485 97,267 92,218 16,272 
2014-15 92,218 112,580 204,798 39,098 165,700 19,827 
2015-16 165,700 105,345 271,045 75,231 195,814 18,492 
2016-17 195,814 128,064 323,879 100,740 223,139 18,536 
2017-18 223,139 128,846 351,985 22,942 329,043 21,465 
2018-19 329,043 115,444 444,487 – – – 
Source: constructed from PFD data. 
 
By 2018, the outstanding debt had increased to a level that alarmed both PFD and 
the Punjab Finance Department. PFD office records show that both departments opposed 
large procurement in 2018. The latter even sent a summary to the Chief Minister in 
March, 2018 before the Punjab cabinet met to set a procurement target for the year. The 
summary noted that there was hardly any justification for large procurement in 2018 
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when a stock of 3.59 million ton was already available with PFD and Rs. 329 billion were 
owed to banks on account of previous wheat operations. The Finance Department 
suggested to keep new procurement strictly to whatever PFD needed (additional to 
existing stocks) for issuance to flour mills over the year and using the saving to retire the 
outstanding debt (PFD office records). But with the general elections due in a few 
months, the advice was a little untimely. The Chief Minister promptly overruled it. 




For the consortia of banks, things could not have been better. Lending to the 
government is the least risky and has little transaction costs, if any. Banks get a 
competitive interest rate from a borrower who is happy to pay the mark-up year after year 
on a growing portfolio. Their principal amount is secure against sovereign guarantees. It 
is hard to escape the conclusion that banks have been a major beneficiary of PFD’s wheat 
operations during the past decade. 
 
6.  ACTORS AND THEIR INTERESTS 
According to PFD’s pronouncements (e.g. Dawn 5
th
 April 2017), its wheat 
operations are carried out for the benefit of small farmers. But the above discussion 
shows that the process is anything but friendly for small farmers. Are small farmers still 
benefitting, or are there other groups that are benefitting and are exerting enough policy 
influence to continue PFD’s wheat operations despite not making sense otherwise? To 
answer this question, we will have to critically examine the interests of key actors, such 
as farmers, intermediaries, PFD, flour mills and consumers. 
 
Farmers 
An important reason for government intervention is to avoid a market crash in 
April-May when farmers are trying to dispose off their produce. However, farmers are 
not a homogenous group and they benefit variously from government intervention 
according to what Manig (1990) calls the ‘societal modes of distribution.’ Below we look 
at official statistics on farm size and wheat production to broadly comment on the benefit 
of PFD’s wheat operations on various farmer categories. 
Data on wheat production by farm size in Punjab (Tables 5 and 6) show that 13.27 
percent of farms do not produce wheat at all. Of the 86.73 percent farms that produce 
wheat (comprising 63.71 percent of the total area of private farms), 90.45 percent are 
smaller than 12.5 acres, i.e. 78.45 percent of total farms producing wheat are small farms. 
These farms are only 40.50 percent of the total farm area and 63.56 percent of the area of 
farms reporting wheat. 
Very small farms (<1 acre; 8.94 percent of all farms in Punjab) also do not sell 
wheat because they do not have a marketable surplus. Data on wheat production by farm 
size are not available, but assuming that they produce at the national average of 800 kg 
wheat per acre and consume wheat flour @ 140 kg per capita (Dorosh and Salam, 2008), 
and have an average household size of 6.3 (HIES, 2015-16), they produce less than their 
own consumption even when they allocate the entire area to wheat production. Together, 
non-wheat-producing farms and very small farms are 22.21 percent of all farms in 
Punjab. 
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Table 5 
 Wheat Area by Farm Size in Punjab 
 Total Farms 
Farms Reporting 
Wheat 
Wheat Farms as % of 
Total Farms 
Farm Size (Acre) No. Area (acre) No. Area (acre) No. Area (acre) 
< 1 729,981 306,511 469,412 152,333 8.94 0.52 
1 – 5 2,617507 6,205,234 2,363,425 4,600,168 45.02 15.69 
5 – 12.5 1,412,603 10,478,386 1,285,613 7,078,499 24.49 24.14 
12.5 – 25 359,408 5,812,909 316,642 3,518,254 6.03 12.00 
>25 130,322 6,523,401 117,968 3,289,459 2.25 11.22 
Total 5,249,821 29,326,441 4,553,060 18,683,533 86.73 63.71 
Source: Constructed from Pakistan Agriculture Census 2010 (Tables 1.1 and 6.11). 
 
Table 6 
 Wheat Producing Farms by Farm Size 
 Farms in Punjab 
 No. % 
Total Farms 5,249,821 100 
Farms do not Report Wheat 697,176 13.27 
Farms Reporting Wheat   
< 1 Acre (too small to have a surplus) 469,412 8.94 
1 – 12.15 Acre (mostly excluded by the arduous process) 3,649,028 69.51 
> 12.5 Acre (have marketable surplus and networks) 434,610 8.28 
Source: Constructed from Pakistan Agriculture Census 2010 (Tables 1.1 and 6.11). 
 
Farms of 1-12.5 acres are 69.51 percent of total farms and represent 39.83 percent 
area. These farmers are likely to have a marketable surplus, but the PFD protocols 
discussed above effectively discourage most of them from selling their produce to the 
government. All eight farmers of <12.5 acres that we interviewed testified to this effect. 
Four of them in 2017 and five in 2018 sold their wheat to local traders. Other 
respondents, including PFD officials and grain merchants also observed that farmers in 
this category are more likely to sell in the market than to PFD. 
The last category is farms larger than 12.5 acres. Our field work shows that these 
are PFD’s real clients. These large farms represent only 8.28 percent of total farms but 
23.22 percent of the area. These farmers produce marketable surplus and aspire to sell at 
official price should their local networks enable them to do so. Dorosh and Salam (2008) 
estimate that the top 10 percent wheat farmers in terms of sales account for 47 percent of 
total wheat sales and the top 20 percent account for 67 percent of total wheat sales 
(though not exclusively to PFD). Wheat sales (to PFD and elsewhere) are concentrated at 
the very top! 
Our PFD respondents were of the view that these large farmers use their political 
clout to lobby with the government for an ever-increasing procurement price and large 
annual procurement targets. This is how PFD explained the Punjab government’s refusal 
to accept their suggestion in 2018 for a gradual reduction of procurement targets 
(discussed above). Our field work shows that these farmers also ingratiate themselves 
with local PFD officials so that they get the bardana on a priority basis, their waiting 
166 Rana and Malik 
time is the least at the Centre as they are frequently allowed to jump the queue, and few 
objections are raised to the quality of their harvest. In the words of one large farmer 
respondent: 
I am friends with the Deputy Director in PFD. He regularly visits me on various 
functions. The entire staff knows this. So, they give me bardana promptly and as per my 
requirement. Sometimes, I get bardana and pay the deposit later on. I never face a problem. 
The relationship is not one-sided, though. In deficit years, i.e. when PFD is 
struggling to meet its procurement targets due to high demand in other provinces or 
abroad (e.g. in 2014 (The Nation 14
th
 May 2014)), these farmers come to PFD’s rescue. 
‘When everyone else is trying to make money, we honor our friendships,’ said one farmer 
respondent. In these years, they help local PFD officials meet their targets and reap the 
returns in surplus years in the shape of preferential treatment. Such a symbiotic 
relationship is difficult to establish and maintain for small farmers simply because their 
marketable surplus is too small to be significant for PFD in deficit years. 
In recent past, PFD has attempted to discourage preferred buying from large 
farmers through including a landownership ceiling in eligibility criteria (Dawn 15
th
 April 
2018) or restricting the number of bags a farmer can receive in one go. However, PFD 
officials were skeptical about the effectiveness of these measures because land records 
indicate ownership rather than the operational size of the farm. The latter is usually larger 
than the former because most landholdings are joint but are operated by a single family 
member. So, for example, if a landowner of 20 acres leaves behind five legal heirs with 
equal shares, the land record will indicate five farmers of four acre each, whereas on the 
ground the farm is more likely cultivated by one family members whereas others will 
seek employment elsewhere, if they can. In other words, on record, there are five small 
farmers but, on the ground, there is one large farmer and four persons with non-farm 
incomes. PFD officials opined that this dissonance between the de jure and the de facto 
undermined their efforts to restrict PFD buying to small farmers using land ownership as 
the criteria. 
Estimating the benefit incidence of PFD’s wheat operations on any group of 
farmers is difficult. There are large supply-demand variations from year to year. In years 
of high (anticipated) consumption, the market price may be very close to, or even higher 
than the official price. In May 2014, for example, our farmer respondents in Sheikhupura 
district sold their produce at the farm-gate to intermediaries at Rs. 1,190 per 40 kg as 
against the official price of Rs. 1,200 per 40 kg. In surplus years, however, the market 
price may be significantly lower than the official price. For example, the same farmer 
respondents sold their produce at Rs. 1,160 and Rs. 1,105 per 40 kg in May 2017 and 
April 2018 respectively as against a procurement price of Rs. 1,300. Further, the market 
price also varies according to the farm’s location. A metric ton in a wheat surplus district 
is cheaper than a metric ton in a wheat deficit district, simply because the former has to 
be ultimately transported to high-consumption areas. 
High procurement price benefits wheat-surplus farmers including those who do not sell 
to PFD. It positively impacts farmers’ bargaining position in the market. A rising tide lifts all 
ships. The World Bank (2015) estimates that in the absence of any buying at all by the 
government, the market price may fall to Rs. 950 per 40 kg in a surplus year. The drop will be 
lower if the government does not withdraw from the market but procures smaller quantities. 
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This was the case in 2017 and 2018—both years of a bumper crop and large carry 
forward stocks in PDF granaries. PFD adopted an unofficial go-slow policy and rationed 
bardana to politically networked farmers. Consequently, the market price fell to Rs. 
1,150 – 1,180 per 40 kg in various districts of Punjab in 2017 (compared to the official 
price of Rs. 1,300 per 40 kg). Losing hope in PFD procurement, seven of our farmer 
respondents sold to local traders at the going price (only four sold to PFD; remaining four 
used their wheat for own and extended family’s consumption). This saved them 
(approximately) Rs. 20 per 40 kg for the cost of stitching, loading and transportation, as 
traders collected wheat from the farm-gate and brought their own bags. So, the net 
difference between a farmer selling to PFD and a farmer selling to a local trader in 2017 
was approximately Rs.100–130 per 40 kg. This was, then, the approximate benefit that 
accrued to those of our farmer respondents who sold wheat to PFD in 2017. This benefit 
was not insignificant, but it was confined to medium and large farmers. All four farmers 
in our sample who sold to PFD in 2017 had farms larger than 12.5 acres. The situation 
was very similar in 2018. The market price was even lower and only these same four 
farmers sold to PFD. Another way of putting this is that a system designed and 
implemented in the name of small farmers ended up excluding them from a benefit of Rs. 
100–130 per 40 kg. 
But this is not to suggest that small farmers or those medium farmers who did not 
sell to PFD did not benefit at all. Assuming WB estimates on price-drop in case of 
complete PFD disengagement were correct, farmers who sold to intermediaries also 
benefited between Rs. 200 – 230 per 40 kg. 
 
Beoparis  
Local traders (called beoparis) purchase at the farm gate and pay cash. Beoparis 
use their own bardana, and arrange for loading, transportation and unloading. They 
provide all these services for their profit at the intersection of market and procurement 
prices. The beoparis we interviewed reported selling small quantities of wheat to PFD in 
both 2017 and 2018. They completed all formalities on behalf of the farmers they 
purchased wheat from. To this extent, PFD records were erroneous since they showed 
purchase from farmers. On being asked if PFD officials ever noticed that they were not 
purchasing from farmers, one beopari replied: 
They just care about the farmer’s National Identity Card, and as long as we are 
able to provide that, there is no problem. But it has now become difficult since payment 
is also to be received at the bank. 
Mostly, however, these beoparis stocked wheat in the harvest season and sold to 
retailers, bakers and flour mills subsequently as prices rose gradually. 
Do beoparis make excessive profit? Anecdotal evidence from our fieldwork 
suggests that they do not. Beoparis provide a range of services and maintain a network of 
client farmers from whom they purchase wheat on annual basis. If the difference between 
their cost price and the official price was large in most years, a larger number of investors 
would enter the market and bring down profits.
9
 If it was insignificant, beoparis would 
 
9 There are no significant barriers to entry. All that it takes to become a beopari is to have the capacity 
to buy wheat and to store it for a few months. Most beoparis operate small-scale. Large buyers are flour mills 
and Commission Agents (Arhti) in grain markets. 
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not invest their money and time in wheat operations. For example, as noted above the 
difference between market and procurement price was Rs. 110-130 per 40 kg in 2017. So, 
beoparis buying from the farmer saved in the range Rs. 90-110 (deducting Rs. 20 for 
stitching, etc.) per 40 kg. This is around 7 percent on their investment, which is neither 
insignificant nor excessive. In due course prices rise. The highest they went in 2017 and 
2018 was Rs. 1,540 per 40 kg. Beoparis make money here as well depending upon their 
storage and transaction costs. 
While small farmers benefit from a high procurement price,  beoparis benefit 
from the arduous procurement process. If the process is simplified, a larger 
proportion of small farmers will prefer to present their produce directly at the Centre 
in a surplus year. On the other hand, any additional procedural requirement will 
persuade more of them to sell their stocks in the open market. To the extent the 
process is simplified, they will have a meaningful alternative and their bargaining 
power vis a vis the beopari will improve. 
 
PFD 
During our fieldwork, we came across several instances when rent seeking and 
patronage opportunities created by the bureaucratic process were exploited by 
unscrupulous staff. The loose accountability framework for government officials 
encourages system’s manipulation for personal gain. Our farmer respondents testified, 
and PFD senior management concurred, that in surplus years, it was not uncommon for 
PFD officials to exploit their discretion in issuing bardana, quality control, weighing, etc. 
to strengthen their personal networks. These networks were subsequently deployed to 
gain choice postings, escape audits and avoid accountability. In the words of a senior 
PFD official: “We have some nuisance value, admittedly less than the police but arguably 
more than, say, the livestock department. People like being posted in PFD.” Overall, 
these ‘micro practices of corruption’ (Krishnamurthy, 2012) place PFD officials as 
another beneficiary of the wheat operations in Punjab. 
Clearly, PFD’s interest lies in the continuation of large-scale procurement, 
involing the bureaucratic procedures. We found little evidence during our interaction with 
PFD officials of any soul-searching to re-engineer the business process, reduce 
transaction costs, improve quality of service, or reimagine the subsidy regime. Senior 
officers were, however, visibly perturbed at the ever-rising cost of debt servicing. PFD 
Secretary formally advised the Chief Minister Punjab in 2017 and again in 2018 to retire 
outstanding debt and reduce procurement targets (PFD office records). The advice was 
quietly ignored, as it required diversion of resources from priority projects and risked 





 profit from PFD’s wheat operations in three ways. First, they receive 
their annual capacity-based wheat quota at a below-market price. As noted above, wheat 
prices rose to a peak of Rs. 1,540 per 40 kg in 2017-18, but flour mills received wheat 
from  PFD at a price of  Rs. 1,300 per 40 kg (Table 7). Second, PFD moves wheat at its  
 
10There are 910 mills in Punjab. 80 percent are small-to-medium size. 
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Table 7 
 Subsidy per 40 kg (Rs.) 
 Procurement Price Incidentals Cost Price Release Price Subsidy 
 (1) (2) (1+2=3) (4) (3-4=5) 
2008-09 625 100 725 545-900 180-(-175) 
2009-10 950 200 1,150 975-1,000 175-150 
2010-11 950 293 1,243 975-1,000 268-243 
2011-12 950 323 1,273 1,000 273 
2012-13 1,050 319 1,369 1,075-1,125 294-244 
2013-14 1,200 229 1,429 1,330 99 
2014-15 1,200 282 1,482 1,280-1,330 202-152 
2015-16 1,300 379 1,679 1,300 379 
2016-17 1,300 270 1,570 1,300 270 
2017-18 1,300 380 1,680 1,300 380 
Source: Constructed from PFD data. 
 
expense from areas of procurement to areas of consumption. Wheat production is 
concentrated in Southern and Western Punjab, whereas consumption is spread across the 
province. On average around 0.7-0.8 million tons are moved annually to ensure that 
sufficient stocks are available in each district to meet allocated quota of mills (PFD office 
records). PFD bears the transportation cost (Rs. 60-70 per 40 kg). Third, mills sell flour at 
the standard price regardless of whether wheat is sourced from PFD over the year or 
bought cheaply  the open market at the harvest time. These profits are substantial (Dorosh 
and Salam, 2008). 
PFD sets the flour price periodically as a function of the issue price, transportation 
costs, grinding costs and millers’ margin. The issue price may remain the same or vary 
through the year. There are substantial rent opportunities for mills that receive subsidised 
wheat from the government and sell flour at the market price (Dorosh and Salam, 2008). 
Both millers we interviewed reported grinding cheap wheat purchased from the farmer 
during May-September but selling flour at the (higher) official price. From October to 
April, they grind PFD’s subsidised wheat and sell at the official price. As long as PFD 
bears the cost of storage, wastage and transportation, they have little incentive to buy 
larger quantities during harvest season. 
Consumers: PFD issues wheat to flour mills at prices lower than its cost 
(Table 7). In 2016 and 2017, for example, PFD issued wheat to flour mills on the 
procurement price. This means the entire cost of operations, storage, transportation, 
etc. was picked up by PFD as a subsidy to consumers. In other years, the general 
trend has been to pick up part of the incidentals in the hope that this subsidy would 
be passed on to consumers.  
This is not to suggest that the cost absorbed by PFD is equivalent to consumer 
subsidy, which would be the difference between the consumer price of wheat flour with 
and without PFD intervention. We make no effort to estimate that. All that is said above 
(and in Table 7 below) is that PFD picked up the entire cost of its wheat operations 
(Tables 2 and 3) as a subsidy to consumers in 2015-17. If PFD improves its efficiency or 
reduces its borrowing costs, it can provide wheat to flour mills at the same price as in 
2017, but at a smaller cost to itself. 
170 Rana and Malik 
Consumers are a diverse group and various sub-groups are affected differently. 
Wheat-deficit rural households and urban consumers are directly affected by a change in 
flour prices. According to official data (PBS, 2015: Table 7), wheat products account for 
12.84 percent of total household expenditure in Punjab. Bottom two quintiles spend 20.65 
percent and 17.73 percent respectively of their income on wheat flour (PBS, 2015). These 
quintiles are vulnerable to the adverse effects of price increases. 
Will the price of wheat flour rise by the amount of subsidy if PFD stops wheat 
operations? Certainly not. Instead, flour price may decrease due to two reasons. First, in 
the absence of public intervention, the wheat price will fall at the harvest time and traders 
will stock up at these low market prices. Second, the private sector’s wastage and 
storage/transportation costs will be lower than PFD incidentals (Aamir, 2017). Thus, 
mills’ net cost will be lower than it is in the current interventionist regime. 
What will be the net effect if PFD procures wheat but without having to pay 
interest on the piled-up outstanding debt? Data in Table 4 show that current borrowing in 
2017 accounted for only 36.60 percent of the total PFD debt. If PFD had to pay mark-up 
only on its borrowing for current operations, its incidentals would be correspondingly 
less. Adjusting the mark-up as shown in Table 3 accordingly gives us a figure of Rs. 
205.19 per 40 kg for PFD incidentals, were there no outstanding debt. If PFD procures 
wheat at the official price and if it pays mark-up only on new borrowing, its cost price of 
wheat at the time of issuance to flour mills will be Rs. (1,300 + 205.19 =) 1,505.19 per 40 
kg. If PFD provides no subsidy at the issuance of wheat, cost of flour will increase by Rs. 
205.19 per 40 kg; if it provides subsidy at the current level (viz. Rs. 379 per 40 kg), cost 
of flour will decrease by Rs. (205.19–379 =) 173.81 per 40 kg, ceteris paribus. In other 
words, consumers are paying Rs. 173.81 extra per 40 kg for Punjab government’s failure 
to retire its outstanding debt. 
 
7.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
We have documented above how banks, small/middle/large farmers, beoparis, 
flour mills and PFD officials benefit from Punjab’s wheat subsidy regime. By looking at 
the micro-processes of procurement and by dissecting numbers, we make a case for 
reimagining the wheat subsidy regime so that a greater incidence of benefit falls upon 
small farmers and consumers in whose name the subsidy is maintained. In 2017-18, the 
total cost of PFD’s wheat operations was Rs. 34.43 billion. This is not an insignificant 
amount for a province whose total budget in that year was Rs. 1,970 billion (Punjab, 
2018). The similar cost incurred year after year is like a small, non-fatal wound that 
bleeds the body imperceptibly and steadily. This ‘friendly fire’ consumes valuable 
resources, excludes small farmers and deprives the consumers of a potential benefit. 
The question immediately arises: when all this is known to the government, why 
does it not reform the subsidy regime? PFD leadership admitted that government’s 
reluctance emanated from fears that reform would result in low wheat prices in the 
harvest season and high and volatile flour prices in the rest of the year, both of which 
may lead to violent unrest. These fears are not totally unfounded. Global evidence 
suggests that subsidy reforms may trigger a series of events that are potentially 
destabilising, especially when latent political discontent exists (Gutner, 2002; Hopkins, 
1988). Amid (2006) has cited several cases where subsidy reforms provoked popular 
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unrest. Therefore, gradual reform will be a safer strategy for the government, starting 
with improved targeting, open sharing of ideas, and awareness of the general public on 
the reasons behind actions being taken. 
Government’s reform options depend on its objectives. If the objective is to 
address the short-term problem of the government’s mounting fiscal burden, it is 
imperative to repay the high-cost, short-term debt to commercial banks. Procurement 
targets better aligned with PFD’s releases to flour mills will enable PFD to clear each 
year’s liabilities within that year. Clearly, PFD should not allow its outstanding liabilities 
to mount again. As seen above, this serves neither the government nor its target groups. If 
the objective is to develop a more efficient wheat market, the government should 
gradually reduce its footprint on the wheat landscape. Instead, it should strategically 
intervene to regulate the interaction amongst farmers, beoparis, mills and consumers. If 
the objective is to address the structural issue of small-farmer exclusion, the government 
should reform the business process. These objectives are not mutually exclusive. 
The way forward emerges from our discussion above. First, the government should 
improve the evidence base for price setting and strengthen PFD’s analytical capacity so 
that procurement prices and targets reflect market requirements and PFD’s strategic 
objectives and fiscal space. In general, the procurement price should be better aligned 
with the international price. This price should be kept flexible so that it can move both 
ways in response to market conditions. If the government liberalises international trade 
and restricts regulation of import/export to exceptional circumstances, international prices 
will provide the hedge against inflationary pressure on domestic prices. However, as 
noted by Pieters and Swinnen (2016) and Alonso and Swinnen (2016), linking domestic 
prices to international prices will transmit the latter’s volatility to the former. This will 
defeat an important purpose of PFD’s wheat procurement regime. To avoid such an 
outcome, the government should continue to intervene in the market strategically. 
Second, the government should initiate measures to offset the adverse effects of price 
liberalisation in the short run. We propose the creation of a Wheat Support Fund, to 
which should go savings from reduced PFD costs. This Fund should be used exclusively 
for improving wheat-related rural infrastructure, and for supporting the development of 
wheat storage by farmers in particular and the private sector more generally. Currently, 
even large farmers and traders have little incentive to invest in storage facilities as they 
cannot compete with massively subsidised PFD operations. But a reduced PFD role will 
create the space for farmers/traders to develop their own storage facilities. If PFD 
staggers its procurement over the May-October period and provides a premium for later 
procurement, this will incentivise middle/large farmers to hold on to their wheat for 
longer, rather than dispose it off at once in the harvest season. Small farmers will benefit 
indirectly, as there will be correspondingly less wheat for the market to clear in the 
harvest season. Staggering procurement will also reduce PFD’s cost of storage and mark-
up charges to the extent that PFD procures smaller quantities in April-May. The premium 
paid for later purchases should be smaller than PFD’s cost in case of earlier purchases. 
Third, PFD’s business process should be improved to make the procurement process less 
problematic especially for small farmers. PFD should consider accepting wheat in 
farmers’ bardana or at least restricting its bardana issuance to farmers as per small 
farmers’ production capacity. Finally, as earlier advocated by Dorosh and Salam (2008), 
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PFD should issue wheat to flour mills on market rates through open auction, rather than 
on capacity-based quotas and arbitrary prices. This will help PFD recover some of the 
costs of its wheat operations. This will also increase mills’ incentive to procure larger 
quantities from farmers at the harvest time and store these under their own arrangement 
for later use. To this extent, procurement, transportation and storage functions will 
transfer from PFD to flour mills. 
A reduced PFD footprint may benefit consumers through lower wheat flour prices 
at least in surplus years when domestic production is plenty and export opportunities are 
scanty. Consumers will benefit from increased wheat purchases by flour mills and 
beoparis at harvest time. To protect low-income consumers against price volatility and 
higher flour prices in deficit years, the government may consider direct cash provision. It 
should be possible to target such cash provision to the bottom two quintiles through the 
existing databases of poor households (e.g. the one maintained by the Benazir Income 
Support Programme). A key challenge will be to regularly update the database and 
enhance bureaucratic capacity to identify households most in need of cheap flour. There 
is plenty of evidence from across the globe suggesting that targeted subsidies may help 
the poor at lower costs (Alderman, et al. 2018; Gentilini, 2016; Lofgren and El-Said, 
2001; Margolies and Hoddinott, 2015; Subbarao, et al. 1997). However, care must be 
taken that the cost of alternative programs is not higher than the generalised subsidy that 
they will replace. 
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